

























Dynamics of Output Growth, Consumption and Physical Capital 

















Department of Economics and Related Studies 
University of York 
Heslington 













This paper examines a two-period model of optimal nonlinear income taxation
with learning-by-doing, in which second-period wages are an increasing function
of ￿rst-period labour supply. We consider the cases when the government can
and cannot commit to its second-period tax policy. In both cases, the canonical
Mirrlees/Stiglitz results regarding optimal marginal tax rates no longer apply. In
particular, if the government cannot commit and skill-type information is revealed,
it is optimal to distort the high-skill consumer￿ s labour supply downwards through
a positive marginal tax rate to relax the incentive-compatibility constraint. Alter-
natively, if the government cannot commit and skill-type information is concealed,
it is optimal to distort the high-skill consumer￿ s labour supply upwards to relax
the incentive-compatibility constraint, but due to some other factors at work the
high-skill consumer￿ s marginal tax rate cannot be signed. Our analysis therefore
identi￿es a setting in which a positive marginal tax rate on the highest-skill indi-
vidual can be justi￿ed, despite its depressing e⁄ect on labour supply and wages.
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In recent years, a literature known as the ￿ new dynamic public ￿nance￿has emerged
that extends the static Mirrlees [1971] model of optimal nonlinear income taxation to a
dynamic setting. For the most part, this literature assumes that random productivity
shocks determine future wages, and that the government can commit to its future tax
policy.1 In this paper, we assume that wages are determined by ￿ learning-by-doing￿ , i.e.,
an individual who works longer in the present becomes more productive through work
experience, and therefore enjoys higher wages in the future. Our interest in learning-by-
doing stems from the observation that, while the role of education in raising wages has
received a great deal of attention in terms of its implications for redistributive taxation,
as far as we know the similar role of learning-by-doing has received no attention.2 Given
that work experience is arguably at least as important as formal education in raising
productivity in many occupations, the implications of learning-by-doing for redistrib-
utive taxation are potentially important. We consider the case when the government
can commit to its future tax policy, but we also consider the case when the government
cannot commit. We think the no-commitment case is particularly relevant, since the
second-best nature of the Mirrlees framework stems from the assumption that an indi-
vidual￿ s skill type is private information. But taxation in earlier periods may result in
this information being revealed to the government, which would enable the government
to implement ￿rst-best taxation in latter periods. As a result, some individuals may be
reluctant to reveal their skill type in earlier periods, in order to avoid being subjected
to ￿rst-best taxation in latter periods.
We work with the two-type version of the Mirrlees model with a single consumer of
each type, but extend it to a two-period setting. It is well known that in the static two-
type model, a government with redistributive goals will impose a positive marginal tax
1See Golosov, et al. [2006] for a review of the ￿ new dynamic public ￿nance￿literature. This literature
has been developed by macroeconomists who recognise that the representative-agent (Ramsey) approach
to optimal taxation omits some important features that are relevant for determining optimal taxes.
Recent contributions to this literature include Kocherlakota [2005], Albanesi and Sleet [2006], and
Werning [2007].
2Learning-by-doing has featured in growth models with taxation, but the focus is on how the gov-
ernment can set taxes to smooth the business cycle. For example, see Martin and Rogers [2000].
2rate on the low-skill type and a zero marginal tax rate on the high-skill type.3 The ratio-
nale for the positive marginal tax rate on the low-skill type is to distort her labour supply
downwards to relax the high-skill type￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint. One might
expect that learning-by-doing simply gives the government an additional motive for mar-
ginal distortions, e.g., distorting the low-skill type￿ s ￿rst-period labour supply upwards
may facilitate redistribution by increasing her second-period wage. Or distorting both
types ￿rst-period labour supply upwards may increase social welfare via higher second-
period wages. However, the only motive the government has to implement marginal
tax rate distortions remains that to relax the high-skill type￿ s incentive-compatibility
constraint. This is because the consumers rationally consider the e⁄ect on their second-
period wage when deciding their ￿rst-period labour supply. Thus the government has
no reason to distort individual behaviour to correct any sort of dynamic inconsistency.4
Nevertheless, we show that the static optimal marginal tax rate results no longer apply,
even when the government can commit to its second-period tax policy.
When the government can commit, it may be optimal for the low-skill type to face
a negative marginal tax rate in the ￿rst period in order to relax the high-skill type￿ s
incentive-compatibility constraint. This result also applies when the government cannot
commit. Moreover, when the government cannot commit, the standard ￿ no-distortion-
at-the-top￿result no longer holds. If the consumers are separated in period 1, thus giving
the government enough information to implement ￿rst-best taxation in period 2, it is
optimal for the high-skill type to face a positive marginal tax rate in period 1. This is
because the government wants to distort the high-skill type￿ s ￿rst-period labour supply
downwards to relax the incentive-compatibility constraint. If the consumers are pooled
in period 1, thus constraining the government to use second-best taxation in period 2,
the government wants to distort the high-skill type￿ s ￿rst-period labour supply upwards
3There is a large literature that works with the two-type version of the Mirrlees [1971] model intro-
duced by Stiglitz [1982]. This is due to its simplicity, but also because theory alone sheds little light on
the pattern of optimal marginal tax rates over the intermediate skills range. An exception is Boadway
and Jacquet [2006], who show that some features of the entire optimal income tax schedule can be
characterised theoretically if the government￿ s objective is a maxi-min social welfare function.
4In general, if consumers exhibit dynamically inconsistent preferences, then a clear-cut case can be
made for corrective taxation. For example, see O￿ Donoghue and Rabin [2006] for a time-inconsistency
argument in favour of taxes on unhealthy foods.
3to relax the incentive-compatibility constraint. This suggests that the high-skill type
should face a negative marginal tax rate in period 1, but due to some other factors at
work the high-skill type￿ s ￿rst-period optimal marginal tax rate cannot be signed.
Since the second period of our model is the last period, the optimal tax problem in
the second period is identical to that in a static model, and therefore the static results
apply. The only exception is when ￿rst-best taxation is possible in the second period, in
which case both consumers naturally face zero marginal tax rates. Our focus therefore
is on optimal taxation in the ￿rst period, since it is the ￿rst period that captures the
essential challenge of dynamic taxation. That is, when choosing its present tax policy,
the government must also consider how this a⁄ects its taxation possibilities in the future.
The present paper is related to recent work by Berliant and Ledyard [2005], Apps
and Rees [2006], and Brett and Weymark [2008c]. These papers also employ two-period
nonlinear income tax models in which the government cannot commit, although learning-
by-doing does not feature in their models.5 Instead, they assume that wages are ￿xed
and constant through time. In Berliant and Ledyard [2005] there is a continuum of types,
and their focus is on deriving conditions under which the consumers are separated in the
￿rst period. They contrast this possibility with the in￿nite-horizon model of Roberts
[1984], in which the consumers are never separated. In Apps and Rees [2006] and Brett
and Weymark [2008c] there are only two types, but in Apps and Rees [2006] there is a
continuum of consumers of each type while in Brett and Weymark [2008c] there is a single
consumer of each type. This makes partial pooling possible in Apps and Rees [2006],
while in Brett and Weymark [2008c] the consumers are either separated or pooled.6 Our
model is therefore most closely related to that of Brett and Weymark [2008c]. They
show that the static optimal marginal tax rate results remain intact if the government
can commit. The static results also remain intact in the ￿rst period if the government
5Gaube [2007] also considers a two-period model of nonlinear income taxation without learning-by-
doing, but assumes that the government can commit. His focus is on showing that, if the government
cannot control consumption in each period due to ￿ hidden￿savings, then the government cannot imple-
ment the optimal long-term tax contract with a pair of short-term tax contracts. This problem does
not arise in our model, however, since we assume there are no savings.
6The focus of Brett and Weymark [2008c] is on the desirability of nonlinear savings taxation; there
are no savings in the Apps and Rees [2006] model.
4cannot commit and there is separation. However, if there is pooling, the high-skill type
faces a positive marginal tax rate and the low-skill type faces a negative marginal tax
rate in the ￿rst period.7 Our analysis shows that these results no longer hold￿ and are
often reversed￿ when wages are determined by learning-by-doing.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the key
features of the model that we consider. Section 3 examines optimal income taxation with
commitment, while Section 4 examines optimal income taxation without commitment.
Section 5 contains some closing remarks, while proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2 The Economy
There are two consumers in the economy, who both live for two periods. Consumption
by consumer i (i = 1, 2) in period t (t = 1, 2) is denoted by ct
i, and labour supply by
consumer i in period t is denoted by lt
i. Consumer i￿ s wage is equal to w1




i) in period 2, where it is assumed that @w2
i(￿)=@l1
i > 0 which captures
the notion of learning-by-doing. That is, an increase in consumer i￿ s labour supply in







1) for all levels of l1
2 and l1
1, so consumer 1 is the low-skill
worker and consumer 2 is the high-skill worker. Consumer i￿ s pre-tax income in period




The consumers have identical preferences over consumption and labour in each pe-
riod, which are represented by the additively separable utility function u(ct
i) ￿ v(lt
i),
where u(￿) is increasing and strictly concave and v(￿) is increasing and strictly convex.
To obtain an expression for the marginal tax rate faced by consumer i in period t, sup-
pose the consumers faced smooth nonlinear income tax functions T 1(y1
i) and T 2(y2
i) in
periods 1 and 2, respectively.8 Then consumer i￿ s behaviour can be described by the
7It should be noted that these distortions are not implemented to relax an incentive-compatibility
constraint. When there is pooling, the government o⁄ers a single tax treatment which in e⁄ect is chosen
based on an average of the high-skill and low-skill wage rates. This results in the high-skill type￿ s labour
supply being distorted downards, and the low-skill type￿ s labour supply being distorted upwards, to
earn the same level of pre-tax income.































where for simplicity it is assumed that there are no savings and future utility is not
discounted. Thus a consumer￿ s lifetime utility is the simple sum of her utility in each
period, and consumption in each period cannot exceed post-tax income in that period.
It is shown in the appendix that the solution to programme (2.1) yields the following








































i denotes the marginal tax rate faced by consumer i in period t. Equation
(2.3) shows that the marginal tax rate in period 2 is equal to one minus the marginal
rate of substitution of pre-tax income for consumption in period 2, which is the same
result as obtained in static models.9 This follows simply from the fact that period 2
is the last period of our model. Similarly, equation (2.2) shows that the marginal tax
rate in period 1 is equal to one minus the marginal rate of substitution of ￿rst-period
pre-tax income for consumption. However, the marginal rate of substitution in (2.2) is
complicated by the fact that a marginal increase in y1
i, which necessitates a marginal
increase in l1
i, results in a ceteris paribus increase in utility in period 2 via higher wages.
It is the last term in (2.2) that captures this e⁄ect.
may not be di⁄erentiable. Thus we follow the standard practice of deriving expressions for ￿ implicit￿
marginal tax rates in terms of derivatives of the utility function.
9See, e.g., Stiglitz [1982], Weymark [1987], and Brett and Weymark [2008a, 2008b].
63 Optimal Income Taxation with Commitment
If in period 1 the government can commit to its tax policy in period 2, the government
cannot exploit any information that may be revealed in period 1 to redesign its second-


















































































































































































function (3.1) is a utilitarian social welfare function, where the utility functions have
been written in terms of the government￿ s choice variables ct
i and yt
i. Equations (3.2)
and (3.3) are budget constraints requiring that total tax revenues be non-negative in each
period.11 Equations (3.4) and (3.5) are incentive-compatibility constraints for consumer
1 and consumer 2, respectively. Following the standard practice, we assume that the
government knows there is one low-skill and one high-skill consumer in the economy,
but each individual￿ s skill type is private information. The government must therefore
satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraints to induce the consumers to choose their
intended tax contracts, rather than ￿ mimicking￿the other consumer by choosing the
10A tax contract consists of pre-tax income and post-tax income (which is equal to consumption) in
each period. The di⁄erence between pre-tax income and consumption is total taxes paid (or transfers
received). While we do not observe such a tax system in practice, the ￿ Revelation Principle￿implies that
any tax system (or any mechanism) can be replicated by an incentive-compatible direct mechanism.
11As with the consumers, for simplicity we do not permit the government to save.
7other consumer￿ s tax contract. We focus on what Stiglitz [1982] calls the ￿ normal￿case
and what Guesnerie [1995] calls ￿ redistributive equilibria￿ , in the sense that we assume
the high-skill consumer￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint (3.5) binds at an optimum
while the low-skill consumer￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint (3.4) is slack.12 Most
of the literature has focused on this case, the rationale being that the government uses
its taxation powers to redistribute from high-skill to low-skill consumers, which creates
an incentive for high-skill consumers to mimic low-skill consumers, but not vice versa.
It is shown in the appendix that the solution to programme (3.1) ￿(3.5) yields:
Proposition 1 Optimal income taxation with learning-by-doing and when the govern-
ment can commit to its second-period tax policy is characterised by: MTR1
1 is ambiguous,
MTR1
2 = 0, MTR2
1 > 0, and MTR2
2 = 0.
The pattern of marginal tax rate distortions in the second period￿ namely, that
consumer 1 faces a positive marginal tax rate and consumer 2 faces a zero marginal
tax rate￿ is the same as that in a static model. It is straightforward to show that the
consumers are separated in the ￿rst period,13 so the government actually has enough
information to implement ￿rst-best (lump-sum) taxes in the second period. However,
because the government has committed to not exploit any information revealed in period
1, it is obligated to use second-best (incentive-compatible) taxation in period 2. Hence
the usual pattern of marginal tax rate distortions is obtained.
Consumer 2 also faces a zero marginal tax rate in period 1, but consumer 1￿ s marginal
tax rate cannot be signed. In particular, it is now possible that the government will want
to distort consumer 1￿ s ￿rst-period labour supply upwards via a negative marginal tax
rate to relax consumer 2￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint. There are two forces at
work here. On the one hand, consumer 1 works longer than consumer 2 when both
choose to earn y1
1 (since w1
1 < w1
2). Therefore, consumer 1 su⁄ers a greater disutility
from labour supply in period 1 than does a mimicking consumer 2. This gives the
12We will continue to assume that the low-skill consumer￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint never
binds; it is therefore omitted throughout the remainder of the paper.
13Using equations (A.6) and (A.8) in the appendix, it can be shown that c1
2 > c1
1. Hence the consumers
make di⁄erent choices in the ￿rst period, which allows the government to identify the low-skill consumer
and the high-skill consumer.
8government the usual motive to distort consumer 1￿ s labour supply downwards via a
positive marginal tax rate to deter mimicking. But on the other hand, learning-by-doing
implies that second-period wages are increasing in ￿rst-period labour supply. Consumer
1 may therefore obtain a greater increase in her second-period utility from her ￿rst-
period labour supply than does a mimicking consumer 2. Accordingly, it is possible
that the lifetime marginal disutility that consumer 1 incurs from additional ￿rst-period
labour is less than that incurred by a mimicking consumer 2, even though consumer
2 when mimicking works less than consumer 1. If this is the case, the government
can relax the incentive-compatibility constraint by distorting consumer 1￿ s ￿rst-period
labour supply upwards through a negative marginal tax rate. It is also possible that the
lifetime marginal disutilities that consumer 1 and a mimicking consumer 2 incur from
additional ￿rst-period labour are the same. In this case, consumer 1 will face a zero
marginal tax rate because distortions to her ￿rst-period labour supply will not relax the
incentive-compatibility constraint.
4 Optimal Income Taxation without Commitment
If in the ￿rst period the government cannot commit to its second-period tax policy,
there are two possibilities: (i) the consumers are separated in the ￿rst period, giving the
government enough information to implement ￿rst-best taxation in the second period.
(ii) the consumers are pooled in the ￿rst period, meaning no information is revealed
and the government must use second-best taxation in the second period. Since the
consumers￿ in particular the high-skill consumer￿ know that if they reveal their types in
period 1 they will be subjected to ￿rst-best taxation in period 2, the high-skill consumer
must be o⁄ered a relatively attractive tax contract in period 1 to compensate for the
unfavourable tax treatment she will receive in period 2. From a social welfare point of
view, the lack of redistribution in period 1 required to obtain type information may be
too costly. Instead, the government may be better o⁄ o⁄ering the same tax contract to
both consumers in period 1 so that no type information is revealed, even though it is
then constrained to use second-best taxation in period 2. As Brett and Weymark [2008c]
9note, deciding whether the government is better o⁄ with a tax system that separates
or pools in the ￿rst period requires a comparison of the maximised values of the social
welfare function in each case. In general, such comparisons depend upon the exact
form of the utility function and the distribution of wages. We therefore examine both
possibilities.
4.1 Separation in Period 1 and First-Best Taxation in Period 2
If the consumers are separated in the ￿rst period, the government￿ s behaviour in the

































2 ￿ 0 (4.2)
where (4.1) is social welfare in period 2, and (4.2) is the second-period budget constraint.
Since the government can identify the consumers, consumer 1 must accept hc2
1;y2
1i and
consumer 2 must accept hc2
2;y2
2i. That is, the government is not constrained by incentive-
compatibility constraints.



























Both consumers and the government know that, if there is separation in period 1, the
government will solve programme (4.1) ￿(4.2) in period 2. Therefore, the government





















































































2) and b y2




2) represent the tax contract that
consumer 2 would receive in the second period if she mimicked in the ￿rst period.




2i while taking into account how its choice
will a⁄ect social welfare in period 2. Its ￿rst-period objective function (4.3) therefore
includes the second-period value function W 2(￿). Equation (4.4) is the ￿rst-period budget
constraint, while (4.5) is consumer 2￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint. In order for
consumer 2 to be willing to reveal her type in period 1, the utility she obtains from hc1
2;y1
2i
in period 1 plus the utility she obtains from the ￿rst-best tax contract hc2
2(￿);y2
2(￿)i that
she must accept in period 2 has to be greater than or equal to the utility she could obtain
from hc1
1;y1
1i in period 1 plus the utility from the second-best tax contract hb c2
2(￿);b y2
2(￿)i
she would choose in period 2. That is, if consumer 2 chooses hc1
1;y1
1i in period 1, the




2, the government o⁄ers consumer 2 an incentive-compatible tax contract
hb c2
2(￿);b y2
2(￿)i in period 2.
It is shown in the appendix that the solutions to programmes (4.1) ￿(4.2) and (4.3)
￿(4.5) together imply:
Proposition 2 Optimal income taxation with learning-by-doing, when the government
cannot commit to its second-period tax policy, and when the consumers are separated in
the ￿rst period is characterised by: MTR1
1 is ambiguous, MTR1
2 > 0, MTR2
1 = 0, and
MTR2
2 = 0.
The zero marginal tax rate faced by both consumers in period 2 follows simply from
the ￿rst-best nature of taxation in that period. What is more interesting is the pattern
of marginal tax rate distortions in period 1. In particular, the high-skill consumer
necessarily faces a positive marginal tax rate. The reason is as follows. The ￿rst-best
allocation in period 2 involves both consumers receiving the same level of consumption,
but consumer 2 works longer than consumer 1.14 Therefore, consumer 2 obtains a lower
level of utility than consumer 1 in the second period. Indeed, it can be shown that
for the many-consumer case, ￿rst-best taxation has utility decreasing in wages, since
14Using equations (A.21) and (A.23) in the appendix we obtain u0(c2
1) = u0(c2
2) which implies that
c2
1 = c2




2 which implies that l2
1 < l2
2.
11all consumers receive the same level of consumption but labour supply is increasing in
skill type. By distorting consumer 2￿ s labour supply downwards in the ￿rst period, the
government is decreasing her second-period wage, but actually increasing her second-
period utility. Consumer 2￿ s consumption in the second period falls, but her labour
supply falls by more, resulting in a net increase in utility. This makes consumer 2
more willing to reveal her type in period 1, i.e., the incentive-compatibility constraint is
relaxed.
The sign of the marginal tax rate faced by consumer 1 in period 1 is ambiguous.
This is for the same reasons as to why it is ambiguous when the government can commit
(see Section 3), but now there are some additional complications. On the one hand,
distorting consumer 1￿ s ￿rst-period labour supply upwards raises her second-period wage.
This reduces the extent of redistribution undertaken using ￿rst-best taxation in period
2, which makes consumer 2 better o⁄ and thereby relaxes the incentive-compatibility
constraint. On the other hand, if consumer 2 were to mimic consumer 1 in the ￿rst
period, any upward distortion to consumer 1￿ s labour supply would also involve an
increase in a mimicking consumer 2￿ s labour supply. As it is not clear how an increase in
both consumers￿second-period wages a⁄ects consumer 2￿ s welfare in period 2, the e⁄ect
on the incentive-compatibility constraint is also unclear. Thus these additional factors
further serve to make consumer 1￿ s ￿rst-period marginal tax rate ambiguous.
4.2 Pooling in Period 1 and Second-Best Taxation in Period 2
If the consumers are pooled in the ￿rst period, the government￿ s behaviour in the second





















































where (4.6) is social welfare in period 2, (4.7) is the second-period budget constraint, and
12(4.8) is consumer 2￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint. The solution to the above pro-













where y1 denotes the pre-tax income earned by both consumers in the ￿rst period. Sub-
stituting these functions into (4.6) yields the value function W 2(y1;w1
1;w1
2).
Both consumers and the government know that, if there is pooling in period 1, the
government will solve programme (4.6) ￿(4.8) in period 2. Therefore, the government

























1 ￿ 0 (4.10)
where hc1;y1i is the tax contract o⁄ered to both consumers in period 1. When choosing
hc1;y1i, the government considers how its choice will a⁄ect social welfare in period 2. Its
￿rst-period objective function (4.9) therefore includes the second-period value function
W 2(￿). Equation (4.10) is the ￿rst-period budget constraint. As both consumers are of-
fered the single choice of hc1;y1i, the government does not face an incentive-compatibility
constraint in the ￿rst period.15
It is shown in the appendix that the solutions to programmes (4.6) ￿(4.8) and (4.9)
￿(4.10) together imply:
Proposition 3 Optimal income taxation with learning-by-doing, when the government
cannot commit to its second-period tax policy, and when the consumers are pooled in the
￿rst period is characterised by: MTR1
1 is ambiguous, MTR1
2 is ambiguous, MTR2
1 > 0,
and MTR2
2 = 0. Moreover, MTR1
1 + MTR1
2 < 0 which implies that MTR1
1 < 0 and/or
MTR1
2 < 0.
When there is pooling in the ￿rst period, the second-period optimal tax problem
is identical to that in a static model. Hence the usual pattern of marginal tax rate
distortions is obtained in period 2. To understand why the marginal tax rates faced by
15Although the government does face the second-period incentive-compatibility constraint (4.8) indi-
rectly through the value function W2(￿).
13both consumers in period 1 are ambiguous, suppose learning-by-doing was absent from
the model. Then without taxation, consumer 2 would choose to earn a higher income
than consumer 1 (as both consumers have the same preferences, but w1
2 > w1
1). When
both consumers are subjected to the same tax treatment in period 1, the government
in e⁄ect chooses y1 based on an average of w1
1 and w1
2. This results in consumer 1￿ s
labour supply being distorted upwards to earn y1 and consumer 2￿ s labour supply being
distorted downwards to earn y1. Therefore, without learning-by-doing, consumer 1 would
face a negative marginal tax rate and consumer 2 would face a positive marginal tax
rate. However, with learning-by-doing, it is not necessarily the case that, in the absence
of taxation, consumer 2 would choose to earn a higher income than consumer 1 in the
￿rst period. This is because the lifetime marginal disutility that consumer 1 incurs from
￿rst-period labour may be less than that incurred by consumer 2. (The reasoning is
similar to that for the case when the government can commit, as discussed in Section
3.) Therefore, with learning-by-doing MTR1
1 and MTR1
2 cannot be signed as it is not
clear whether each consumer￿ s labour supply is being distorted upwards or downwards
to earn y1. Furthermore, any marginal increase in y1 will increase consumer 2￿ s ￿rst-
period labour supply, which increases her second-period wage and thereby relaxes the
incentive-compatibility constraint. An increase in w2
2 relaxes the incentive-compatibility
constraint because, in the second period, consumer 2 works longer when revealing herself
than when mimicking. Therefore, there is a higher utility payo⁄ under the former from
a wage increase, which reduces the incentive to mimic. This gives the government a
motive to distort consumer 2￿ s ￿rst-period labour supply upwards to relax the incentive-
compatibility constraint, which is the opposite of the case when there is separation.
But since the consumers are pooled in period 1, any increase in y1 used to increase
consumer 2￿ s labour supply will also increase consumer 1￿ s labour supply. Thus it can
be determined only that, in aggregate, ￿rst-period labour will be distorted upwards, i.e.,
the sum of the ￿rst-period marginal tax rates must be negative.
145 Concluding Comments
The ￿ new dynamic public ￿nance￿literature that extends Mirrlees [1971] to a dynamic
setting has assumed that random productivity shocks determine future wages, and that
the government can commit to its future tax policy. The assumption that the govern-
ment can commit is a strong one, since the present government cannot commit future
governments. For example, Auerbach [2006] cites a recent proposal made to resolve the
U.S. Social Security system￿ s imbalance, which includes a tax increase to be made in
2045! As Auerbach notes, such a proposal cannot be taken seriously.
Recent contributions by Berliant and Ledyard [2005], Apps and Rees [2006], and
Brett and Weymark [2008c] have dropped the commitment assumption, but they assume
that wages are ￿xed. By contrast, we have assumed that learning-by-doing determines
future wages, and that the government may not be able to commit. Given that the sole
source of heterogeneity in the Mirrlees framework is wage di⁄erentials, understanding
how optimal marginal tax rates respond to changes in wages seems particularly relevant.
It has long been known that endogenous wages in static models make it optimal for the
high-skill type to face a negative marginal tax rate (see Stiglitz [1982]). Recently, Simula
[2007] and Brett and Weymark [2008b] have derived a number of comparative static
results for exogenous changes in wages. However, the ￿ no-distortion-at-the-top￿result
remains intact. Our analysis shows that in a dynamic model with wages determined by
learning-by-doing, the ￿ no-distortion-at-the-top￿result no longer applies, and a positive
marginal tax rate on the high-skill type can be justi￿ed despite its depressing e⁄ect on
labour supply and wages.
6 Appendix
Derivation of Equations (2.2) and (2.3)



































































































Straightforward manipulation of (A.4) and (A.5) yields equation (2.3). After substitut-
ing (2.3) into (A.3) and using (A.2) and (A.4) to eliminate the Lagrange multipliers,
equation (A.3) can be manipulated to yield equation (2.2). ￿
Proof of Proposition 1





















































































































































2 = 0 (A.13)
where ￿
1 is the multiplier on the ￿rst-period budget constraint (3.2), ￿
2 is the multi-
plier on the second-period budget constraint (3.3), ￿ is the multiplier on consumer 2￿ s
16incentive-compatibility constraint (3.5), and b l1
2 = y1
1=w1
2. Equations (A.8) and (A.12)
imply that ￿
1 > 0 and ￿
2 > 0, and therefore both budget constraints are binding. By
assumption (3.5) is binding, and therefore ￿ > 0.







which using (2.3) establishes that MTR2




















which using (2.2) establishes that MTR1
2 = 0.



































































































which using (2.3) establishes that MTR2
1 > 0.
17To show that MTR1


































































The ￿rst two terms on the right-hand side of (A.20) together represent consumer 1￿ s
marginal disutility of ￿rst-period labour (MDL1
1). It is equal to the direct disutility
incurred from working longer in period 1 minus the utility obtained in period 2 via an
increase in the second-period wage. Likewise, the two terms in square brackets on the
right-hand side of (A.20) together represent consumer 2￿ s marginal disutility of ￿rst-
period labour (\ MDL
1
2), but for the case when consumer 2 mimics consumer 1. Since
MDL1
1 ￿ \ MDL
1
2 cannot be signed, MTR1
1 is ambiguous. Speci￿cally, by undertaking
manipulations of (A.20) analogous to those of (A.16) used to sign MTR2
1, it can be
shown that MTR1
1 > 0 if and only if MDL1
1 > \ MDL
1
2, MTR1
1 = 0 if and only if
MDL1
1 = \ MDL
1
2, and MTR1
1 < 0 if and only if MDL1
1 < \ MDL
1
2. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2













































2 = 0 (A.25)
where ￿
2 is the multiplier on the second-period budget constraint (4.2). Dividing (A.22)














which using (2.3) establish that MTR2
1 = 0 and MTR2
2 = 0.
























































































































































































1 is the multiplier on the ￿rst-period budget constraint (4.4), and ￿ is the
multiplier on the incentive-compatibility constraint (4.5). To derive expressions for
@W 2(￿)=@y1
1 and @W 2(￿)=@y1
2, note that the Lagrangian corresponding to programme

















































































































































Dividing both sides of (A.35) by (1 + ￿)u0(c1













































































2 < 0, which establishes that MTR1
2 > 0. Application



































































































where A is the Hessian associated with (A.21) ￿(A.25):
A =
2
6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6
4
u00(c2











1 0 0 1
0 0 u00(c2
2) 0 ￿1











￿1 1 ￿1 1 0
3
7 7 7 7 7
7 7 7 7
5
(A.40)
20and the determinant of A is given by:




























































































































To show that MTR1












































































































































































































The ￿rst term on the right-hand side of (A.44) is ambiguous for the same reasons that
MTR1
1 is ambiguous when the government can commit, i.e., MDL1
1 ￿ \ MDL
1
2 cannot

















1 > 0 and therefore the second term on the right-hand side of (A.44) is
negative. In principle, one could also use these techniques to sign the last term on the
right-hand side of (A.44), but this would require determining the comparative statics of
a second-best nonlinear income tax problem, which are generally too complex to yield
21tractable results.16 Nevertheless, even if the last term in (A.44) could be signed, MTR1
1
would remain ambiguous. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3
When there is pooling in period 1, the second-period optimal tax problem is identical to
that in a static model. We therefore omit the proof of the results that MTR2
1 > 0 and
MTR2
2 = 0.





























1 = 0 (A.46)
where ￿
1 is the multiplier on the ￿rst-period budget constraint (4.10). To derive an
expression for @W 2(￿)=@y1, note that the Lagrangian corresponding to programme (4.6)





















































2 is the multiplier on the second-period budget constraint (4.7), and ￿ is the













































































16Thus far, it has only been possible to derive the comparative static properties of optimal nonlinear
income taxes for the case when preferences are quasi-linear. See Weymark [1987] and Brett and Wey-
mark [2008a, 2008b] for the case when preferences are quasi-linear in labour, and Simula [2007] for the
case when preferences are quasi-linear in consumption. It is not possible to impose quasi-linearity in
our model, since it renders either the ￿rst-best or second-best taxation problems indeterminate.



























































denotes consumer i￿ s marginal rate of substitution of y1 for c1. Using (2.2) we know
that MTR1
i = 1 ￿ MRS1
i . Moreover, since v(￿) is strictly convex and y2
2 > y2
1,17 the
last term in (A.49) is positive, which implies that MRS1
1 +MRS1
2 > 2. This establishes
that MTR1
1 + MTR1
2 < 0. However, the signs of MTR1
1 and MTR1
2 are ambiguous,
since (A.49) provides no information as to whether each consumer￿ s marginal rate of
substitution is greater than, equal to, or less than one. ￿
17Since the second-period optimal tax problem is identical to that in a static model, y2
2 > y2
1 follows
from the well-known result that it is optimal for the high-skill type to earn a higher pre-tax income
than the low-skill type in static models.
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